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Abstract 
This paper analyses the optimal worksharing discount granted to mailers and entrants in a 
liberalized postal sector when there is asymmetric information about the Post Office’s 
costs. When the regulator is unable to ascertain which part of the total cost of sorting has to 
be attributed to each sorting facility, the optimal ‘access discount’ given to the entrants is 
set in a procompetitive way, thus facilitating the entry of firms that are less efficient than 
the Post Office. However, with the same asymmetry of information, the optimal 
‘worksharing discount’ given to the mailers is set to favor the Post Office, even when it is 
less efficient than the mailers in providing the sorting. 
JEL Classification Numbers: L51 
Keywords: Access Pricing, Worksharing Discounts, Competition, Postal Sector. 
 
 
 
Resum 
Este artículo analiza los descuentos óptimos concedidos a los grandes usuarios y a los 
entrantes en el sector postal que realizan una parte de la clasificación de su correspondencia 
antes de entregarla en la red de distribución del operador postal. Cuando el regulador es 
incapaz de determinar que parte de los costes totales de clasificación del operador postal 
tiene que ser asignado a cada una de las fases de clasificación, el descuento óptimo ofrecido 
a los entrantes se establece de forma pro-competitiva, facilitando la entrada de empresas 
que son menos eficientes que el operador postal. Sin embargo, con el mismo tipo de 
asimetría de información, el descuento óptimo ofrecido a los grandes consumidores se 
establece para evitar el bypass del operador postal, incluso cuando este es menos eficiente 
que los consumidores en el proceso de clasificación. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction
The reform in the postal sector initiated in the last decade has been based, at least
in the European Union, on the division between the regulation and the management
of the Post Oﬃce, the liberalization of the commercial mail and the maintenance
of the monopoly over the single-piece mail in order to secure the provision of the
universal service. In this situation, on of the main challenges for the regulatory
policy is to ensure that new operators can access the facilities of the incumbent Post
Oﬃce to distribute the non local letters. The regulator must establish an adequate
access discount for the letters that are collected and pre-sorted by the entrants,
but that are introduced in the Post Oﬃce’s network for its delivery. On the other
hand, some mailers are more eﬃcient than the Post Oﬃce in pre-sorting their
correspondence and would find attractive to bypass the Post Oﬃce’s facilities. As in
the previous case, the challenge of the regulatory policy is to establish an adequate
worksharing discount over the price of the letters that promotes the bypass of the
mailers that are more eﬃcient than the Post Oﬃce. The objective of this paper is
to analyze the determination of the worksharing and access discounts when there
is asymmetric information about the Post Oﬃce’s sub-cost for the sorting activity,
a problem that has not been studied by the literature.
In order to deliver a letter is it necessary to undertake diﬀerent activities, such
as the collection of bulk mail, diﬀerent stages of sorting, transport and distribution.
In this paper we consider that the transport and the distribution of non-local letters
are provided exclusively by the Postal Operator. However, we consider that the
Post Oﬃce, the entrants and the mailers contend for the recollection and the pre-
sorting of the letters. Moreover, we consider that there is a regulator how can
grant a discount to the entrants or the mailers that pre-sort their mail. On the
one hand, she can grant a discount over the final price of the letters to the mailers
that pre-sort their mail.1 On the other hand, she can concede a discount to the
entrants that provide a part of the sorting, but that use the Post Oﬃce network to
distribute their letters.2 As we see, both the mailers and the entrants can obtain
a discount over the price of the letter when they pre-sort their mail. However,
we show that with asymmetric information about the costs the optimal policy for
each discount is diﬀerent. When the regulator is unable to ascertain which part
of the Post Oﬃce’s total cost of sorting has to be attributed to each stage of the
activity, the optimal policy consists of conceding a pro-competitive access discount
to the entrants. This implies that some entrants that are less eﬃcient than the Post
1Sherman (2001) states that "it in the Postal market, instead of purchasing an input, the
mailer supplies one. The input is not an ’essential facility’, it is a common input that the mailer
may supply more eﬃciently than the postal administration".
2Another way to interpret this situation is to suppose that the entrants pay an access price
that consists of the final price of the letters minus the discount.
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Oﬃce may enter the market.3 Interestingly, however, we also found that with the
same type of asymmetric information, the optimal worksharing discount is more
restrictive. Even when the Post Oﬃce is less eﬃcient than the mailers, the optimal
policy may consist of fixing a low discount to avoid the bypass.
As it is standard in the literature, in this paper we assume that asymmetric
information enters our model in two ways.4 First of all, the regulator is unable
to know the productivity of the Post Oﬃce. And secondly, the regulator can not
control the eﬀort that the company’s manager put into reducing the costs. When
a part of the classification is produced outside the Post Oﬃce, the regulator needs
to concede the Post Oﬃce less informational rents to encourage him to increase the
eﬀort. This occurs when the mailers or the entrants pre-sort their letters. However,
the discounts conceded to the mailers and to the entrants aﬀect the prices of the
letters in diﬀerent ways. When an entrant pre-sorts the letters of all the mailers, the
regulator have a better knowledge of the costs of the other stages of classification
that the Post Oﬃce produces. As a consequence, it does not need to distort the
prices to make the firm increase its eﬀort. The entry reduces the informational rents
given to the Post Oﬃce and does not distort the prices. Therefore, the optimal
policy consist of having a pro-competitive attitude with respect to entry.
This situation does not occur when there is no entry but there is a group of
eﬃcient mailers that pre-sort their letters. In this case, the regulator still needs
to identify which part of the total costs of classification of the Post Oﬃce is due
to the pre-sorting. This requires to distort prices with respect to marginal cost
pricing. As a consequence, the optimal policy may mean to avoid the pre-sorting
of the eﬃcient mailers if the diﬀerence of costs between the mailers and the Postal
Oﬃce is small.
Finally, there are some cases where the optimal policy for the two regimes are
reconciled. This occurs, for example, when all mailers have the same sorting costs.
In this case, the worksharing discount for the mailers is also set in a pro-competitive
way, and it may be optimal to allow the bypass of mailers that are less eﬃcient
than the Post Oﬃce. This result is interesting, because it gives a hint of what
occurs in the presence of an entrant that is able to pre-sort the mail of all mailers.
The diﬀerence between worksharing and access discounts has not been analyzed
by the literature, but it deserves special attention because its consequences can
be rather diﬀerent. On the other hand, our conclusion may support the current
practice of some regulatory agencies with respect to the discounts, which consists
of regulating the access charges and oﬀering some commercial flexibility to the Post
Oﬃce in order to fix the worksharing discount for the mailers.
The idea behind this paper is related to the literature on worksharing discounts
3De Fraja (1999) obtains the same result in a model for the telecommunications sector. Indeed,
our model closely follows his paper.
4See Laﬀont and Tirole (1990 and 1993) and De Fraja (1999).
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in the postal sector. Crew and Kleindorfer (1991) introduced the problem of the
worksharing discounts in the postal sector, worried about an excessive discount that
could encourage ineﬃcient entry into the pre-sorting business. In particular, these
authors consider that the letters may be distributed during the peak or the oﬀ-
peak periods. The urgent letters can be sorted in any of these periods, but during
the peak period the sorting costs are higher. They show that when marginal costs
for each class of service are constant, the welfare optimal pre-sort discount (when
the break-even constraint of the incumbent is not an issue) is set at exactly the
unit cost of pre-sorting. When marginal costs are increasing the pre-sort discount
depends on the magnitude of the peak problem, with larger discounts given to
ameliorate peak loads.
Sherman (2001) uses a variant of Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996), who
analyze the optimal access charge in the telecommunications sector. He shows
that with perfect information about the Post Oﬃce costs, the optimal worksharing
discount depends on whether mailers workshare all their mail or not. If they
workshare all their mail, their marginal decisions aﬀect the usage of the mail, and
it is optimal to apply the normal Ramsey inverse-elasticity rule, that is, it is optimal
to establish separate Ramsey prices for single-piece and workshared letters. If the
mailers have an increasing marginal worksharing cost, they workshare until these
costs equal the discount. In this case, the discount aﬀects the fraction of mail that is
workshared by the mailer. Moreover, the worksharing discount should be less than
the cost savings for the Postal Service, which implies that it is optimal to establish
a greater margin on the workshared letters than for the single-piece letters. In a
diﬀerent model, Billete de Villemeur et al. (2002) determine the optimal Ramsey
prices of a regulated postal operator, when there is a group of clients that never
bypasses the Post Oﬃce, and another group of heterogeneous mailers that may or
may not pre-sort their mail. They show that only under special circumstances the
worksharing discount is equal to the marginal (avoided) costs. Moreover, under
plausible conditions, the worksharing discount exceeds the Eﬃcient Component
Pricing Rule (ECPR) level.5 This depends on the demand superelasticities of the
single-piece and workshared letters.
There are few papers that analyze the entry in the postal sector. Crew and
Kleindorfer (2001) analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent kinds of entry on the viability of
the Universal Service Obligation (USO) provided by the Post Oﬃce. They consider
a model where entrants provide end-to-end services for selected customers, and can
hand in some selected mail to the Post Oﬃce for the delivering of some routes.
Their approach relies on the idea that incumbents lose customers and not routes or
5The ECPR was originally proposed by Willig (1979). In particular, the ECPR establishes
that the access charge should be equal to the direct cost of the access plus the incumbent’s
opportunity costs when it supplies one access unit to the rivals. See Baumol (1983) or Laﬀont y
Tirole (2000) for a complete analysis of the properties of the ECPR.
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products to rivals. They argue that entrants would only provide end-to-end service
on the lowest cost, and highest profit routes. Crew and Kleindorfer (2002 and 2003)
analyze the eﬀects of access charges in the USO. They extend the previous paper
to consider the possibility that the regulators can establish diﬀerent access charges
as a function of the last destination of their mail. They name this access system
Delivery-Zone Access Pricing (DAP). "This makes entrants access the Post Oﬃce
network at the two levels, either for delivery or at the single piece rate". They show
that when an uniform price for the letters is fixed, the traditional access policy does
not guarantee the viability of the USO. On the other hand, they emphasize that
the DAP system is more likely to enable the preservation of the USO. Indeed, the
DAP partially eliminates subsidies that would otherwise promote ineﬃcient entry
and use of the Post Oﬃce facilities for downstream access at rates that do not cover
marginal cost of such access. Finally, Billete de Villemeur et al. (2003a and 2003b)
analyze the optimal access pricing rules in the postal sector when there is perfect
and imperfect competition, respectively. In particular, in the second paper they
consider a model of diﬀerentiated oligopoly where operators interact strategically,
and analyze the impact of the uniform pricing on access pricing. Their finding
suggest that, many general principles governing access pricing in competitive fringe
setting remain applicable under imperfect competition.
In contrast to this literature, we are interested in analyzing the worksharing
discount when there is asymmetric information about the Post Oﬃce costs.6 For
this purpose, our model closely follows De Fraja’s (1999), which analyses the access
charge regulation in the telecommunications sector. This author studies the optimal
price policy when there is an incumbent firm which has the monopoly on local calls,
but faces a competitor for the long distance calls. In this model, the regulator does
not know which part of the incumbent’s total calls has to be attributed to each
part of the network. The regulator can neither infer the firm’s cost parameter,
nor his eﬀort in reducing costs. Moreover, the competitor may be less, equally or
more eﬃcient than the incumbent. In this situation, De Fraja (1999) shows that
the regulator will take a pro-competitive attitude, allowing entry even when the
incumbent is more eﬃcient than the entrant. This occurs because entry prevents
the regulated firm from exploiting the regulator’s inability to observe sub-costs.7
6Some papers analyze the bypass problem when there is asymmetric information about the
type of consumers. This is the case, for instance, of Einhorn (1987), Laﬀont and Tirole (1990) and
Curien, Jullien and Rey (1998). In these works it is assumed that the regulated firm can price-
discriminate consumers. On the contrary, in this paper I assume that the regulator observes
the type of consumers, but the firm can not price-discriminate. This may represent a strong
assumption for the discount oﬀered to consumers, but allows us to compare the worksharing
discount with the access discount given to entrants.
7Demski, Sappington and Spiller (1987) and Caillaud (1990) take a diﬀerent approach, con-
sidering that the costs of the regulated firm and the entrants are correlated. Therefore, entry of
ineﬃcient firms can be eﬃcient, because it provides information about the regulated firm’s costs.
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We encounter the same mechanism in our model for the optimal access charge in
the postal sector. But when we consider the worksharing discount given to the
mailers we find that the optimal policy consist of forbidding the bypass, because
pre-sort by the mailers distort the prices with respect to marginal cost pricing.
The rest of the paper continues as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the recent
liberalization of the postal sector. Section 3 analyses the optimal policy for the
worksharing discount oﬀered to the mailers. Section 4 analyses the optimal policy
for the access discount given to one entrant that uses the Post Oﬃce’s network.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Competition in the postal market?
In the postal sector, the delivery of a letter implies diﬀerent activities: collection,
sorting, transport and distribution. Leaving aside distribution, which is labor inten-
sive, the rest of the activities are contestable. New technologies make self-supply
of sorting eﬃcient and economically feasible. On the other hand, developments
in electronic data interchange and computerized systems are lowering the cost of
transport with private companies. Therefore, some mailers or the new operators
can profitably produce these activities with specialized machinery.
Taking into account the costs’ reductions in the postal sector, in the last decade,
several countries have reformed the industry and have introduced competition for
the provision of some activities. However, very few of them have completely lib-
eralized the sector. This is the case of Argentina, Finland, New Zealand and
Sweden.8 In the rest of the countries, the borderline between the monopoly and
the competitive sector takes diﬀerent forms. The Post Oﬃce generally retains part
of the monopoly over the standard correspondence in order to protect the over-
all service. The reserved area enables enough revenues as to cross-subsidize the
non-commercial services, specially with regards to the distribution of the letters
in areas with high costs.9 This is the case of the United States and the European
Union. In the European Union, the Post Oﬃces retain the national monopoly over
the letters that weigh less than 100 grams (50 grams from 2006), but this has not
deterred some private operators from entering in the most profitable cities. In the
particular case of Spain, the delivery of urban letters was completely liberalized
in 1960, but despite this, private operators rely on the Post Oﬃce’s network for
distributing non-local letters.
8Campbell (2001) analyses the reform in Sweden, Germany, New Zealand, Australia, the
United Kingdom and Netherlands. For a study of the reform in the United States see Pickett,
Treworgy and Conrad (2000).
9See Cremer et al. (2000), Crew and Kleindorfer (2000) and Panzar (2000) for an analysis of
the universal service in the postal sector.
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Not surprisingly, the major defenders of the deregulation of the postal market
are the big mailers, dissatisfied with the high cost of the service and its low quality.
This situation has motivated many countries to establish a system of worksharing
discounts that allows the eﬃcient mailers to bypass some of the Post Oﬃce facil-
ities. Bypassing confers services as well as cost savings to the mailers. Indeed,
by controlling when and where their mail enters the postal network, mailers may
increase the quality of their letters. On the other hand, upstream entry may reduce
the number of days for delivery.
In some countries the worksharing discounts are determined by the number of
sorts and facilities that the consumer bypasses before the Post Oﬃce accepts their
mail. Generally, the discounts are based on the avoided cost of the facilities that
are bypassed. This methodology encourages bypassing when mailers can save costs
because they are more eﬃcient than the Post Oﬃce, or when they can provide a
higher quality service.
In the United States, Germany and the Netherlands, the Post Oﬃce provides
substantial discounts to large mailers that barcode and pre-sort their own material.
Such discounts encourage the use of the mail by businesses, who frequently issue
mass mailings for advertising purposes. This has promoted competition in the
upstream activities, as mailers and third party consolidators exploit the diﬀerence
between their own cost and the discounts. Cohen et al. (2000) explain that "over
60 percent of the United States postal volume receives some type of worksharing
discount. Yet, less than a 16 per cent of total volume is pre-sorted all the way
to the carrier route level and dropped at the local or area oﬃces by the private
sector". Indeed, small mailings may not contain enough volume to be sorted and
transported eﬃciently to delivery areas. In this case, consolidators or new operators
may find it profitable to supply this service to small mailers.10
3 The bypass problem
In this section, we follow the work of De Fraja (1999) to consider a simplified mar-
ket of non local mail service, bearing in mind that this service is monopolized by
the Post Oﬃce. We do not consider local delivery, which is supposed to be a com-
petitive activity.11 Mail supply requires two components. The first corresponds to
a composite activity, including collection and several stages of sorting. The second
component is transportation that connects diﬀerent areas or cities and delivery to
the final users.
10See also Crew and Kleindorfer (2002).
11In the countries where the postal sector is liberalized, the new operators frequently enter the
big cities, where they can take advantage of the density economies and where the most profitable
consumers are concentrated.
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The Post Oﬃce provides both types of activities. The collection and the first
stage of the sorting is supplied with a constant average and marginal costs of β.
This is distributed in [β, β] according to a distribution F (β), with density f(β) > 0.
The consumers bypass the first stage of the sorting when they find profitable
to do this activity by themselves. Alternatively, they can send a single-piece letter
through the Post Oﬃce. We consider an heterogeneous group of mailers. The
mailers provide the sorting with a constant average and marginal cost of k, where k
is distributed over [k, k] according to a cumulative distribution G(k), with density
g(k). Initially, we make a simplifying assumption about G(k). Afterwards, we
analyze the eﬀects of relaxing it.
Assumption 1. G(k) is uniformly distributed between [k, k].
When there are no fixed costs, the eﬃciency in the performance of the sorting
is measured directly by β and k. Mailers can be less, equally o more eﬃcient
that the Post Oﬃce. However, in what follows we consider the simplification that
k, k ∈ [β, β). This facilitates the display of the results, but does not aﬀect our
conclusions.
The marginal cost of the additional stages of sorting and transport is given by
αβ, where α > 0 measures the weight of the first stage of the sorting itself relative
to the rest of the sorting activities. Moreover, we coinsider that in this stage of
the sorting the Post Oﬃce can exert an eﬀort, e, to reduce his operating cost. But
this eﬀort implies a cost ψ(e) for the firm, with ψ, ψ > 0, ψ ≥ 0.12
Assumption 2. The unit cost of handing in a letter to the addressee is (1+α)β−e
when the incumbent supplies the complete postal service, and it is k+αβ− e when
the mailers bypass the first sorting facility.
Finally, we consider that it is prohibitively costly for mailers to duplicate the
transport and distribution network. Therefore, they are provided exclusively by
the incumbent Post Oﬃce. In order to simplify the exposition of the model, we
consider that there is not a distribution cost.13
Next we consider Billete de Villemeur et al. (2002) to derive the consumer’s
indirect utility function. Let S denote the surplus of sending non-local letters.
This is a function of the consumption level. We can obtain the net surplus by
subtracting the payment to the Post Oﬃce, plus the sorting cost, if applicable.
Taking this into account we define the demand function for the non-local letters as
12See Laﬀont and Tirole (1990 and 1993).
13This may seem too simplistic, but if we consider that the regulator has perfect information
about the distribution costs it does not modify the main insights of the model. In our model,
in order to account for these costs it would be suﬃcient to add the distribution cost to the final
equation of the price of the letters.
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q(p) = argmax{S(q)− pq}. (1)
Substituting the demand function in the net surplus yields the indirect utility
function, V :
CS(p, p0, k) =



V (p) = S(q(p))− pq(p) if p0 + k > p
V (p0 + k) = S(q(p0 + k))− (p0 + k)q(p0 + k) if p0 + k ≤ p
where p is the price of the letters when the Post Oﬃce provides the collection and
all sorting activities, and p0 is the price of the workshared letters. That is, p−p0 is
the worksharing discount conceded to the mailers that bypass the sorting facilities
of the Post Oﬃce. Taking this into account, q(p0 + k) and q(p) are the demands
for each type of service. We consider that V satisfies the following properties.
Assumption 3. V (p) ≤ 0, V (p) < 0.
We consider that there exist a regulator that determines the Post Oﬃce’s prices,
p and p0, as well as the value of a transfer, t, conceded to the firm.14 The prices
and the transfer are regulated so as to maximise a social welfare function, W .15
Assumption 4. The regulator’s welfare function is given by the weighted sum of
the consumer’s surplus, and the Post Oﬃce’s profit, U , reduced by the transfers of
public funds, t, conceded to the Post Oﬃce.
W =
U k
p−p0 V (p)g(k)dk +
U p−p0
k
V (p0 + k)g(k)dk + λU − t, (2)
where λ ∈ (0, 1) is the weight of profits relative to consumer’s surplus.
14The interpretation of t as a direct transfer to the Post Oﬃce could be somehow appealing to
the postal sector. Alternatively, t could be considered as a reward to managers that depend on
their performance.
15As stated by De Fraja (1999, footnote 4), this objective function is the same as the adopted
by Baron and Myerson (1982). On the other hand, the analysis of Laﬀont and Tirole (1986)
and Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) is conducted on the assumption of equal weights for consumer’s
and producers’ surplus, and a shadow cost of public funding. We consider the same setting than
De Fraja (1999) in order to obtain marginal cost pricing in conditions of symmetric information,
instead of Ramsey pricing. By doing so, we can more adequately compare the optimal worksharing
discount of this section and the optimal access discount of section 4.
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The profit of the Post Oﬃce in equation (2) diﬀers when the firm provides the
sorting to all mailers, UN , from when a part or all mailers provide the first stage of
the sorting by themselves, UE. If the Post Oﬃce supplies to all mailers its profits
are
UN = (p− (1 + α)β + e)
U k
k
q(p)g(k)dk + t− ψ(e). (3)
When a part of the mailers workshare their letters, the profit is given by
UE = (p− (1 + α)β + e)
U k
p−p0 q(p)g(k)dk
+(p0 − αβ + e)
U p−p0
k
q(p0 + k)g(k)dk + t− ψ(e).
(4)
In contrast to the previous case, here the firm has two sources of revenues. The
first one comes from delivering single-piece letters of those mailers with a high
sorting cost. The second one arrives from delivering workshared letters. In this
case, the service is provided with a worksharing discount. On the other hand, we
consider that the firm can refuse to produce if the regulatory contract does not
guarantee a minimum level of expected profit. This forces the regulator to respect
a "participation" constraint for the firm.
Finally, we consider that the regulator has limited capacity to audit the regu-
lated firm’s sub-cost. However, it knows the mailers’ sorting cost. This is summa-
rized in the following assumption.
Assumption 5. The regulator fixes p, p0, and t. She knows, k, α and the distri-
bution of β. But she can not know the true value of β and the eﬀort undertaken for
reducing the cost, e. The regulator observes the expost total cost of the Post Oﬃce
and conditions the values of p, p0, and t to the observed cost levels.
We establish therefore, that the regulator is unable to know which proportion
of the firm’s total cost of sorting is to be attributed to the first stage and which to
the rest. However, the realized total cost, the quantities produced and the prices
are all verifiable.
3.1 The optimal worksharing discount
Following De Fraja (1999), in the next proposition we determine the optimal p,
p0, e and t, when the regulator can observe β. We calculate the values of these
variables when bypassing does not occur, and when some mailers classify their own
mail. Further on, in the next proposition we will determine the optimal ’cut-oﬀ’
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point, that is, the value of β under which entry will not be allowed. In order to
ensure the suﬃciency of the first order conditions, we first introduce the following
assumption.
Assumption 6. For all admissible p, p0 and e: ψ(e) > −Q˜

1(p(β)) and ψ
(e) >
−Q1(p(β), p0(β))−Q0(p(β), p0(β)).
where Q˜1(p(β)) is the aggregate supply when bypassing is not allowed, and
where Q1(p(β), p0(β)) and Q0(p(β), p0(β)) represent the aggregate supply of the
single-piece letters and workshared letters when bypassing occurs.
The optimal policies when bypassing is not allowed and when it is permitted
are defined in the following proposition. See the proofs in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Considering assumptions 1-6, when the regulator know β and the
cut-oﬀ point is β∗, the optimal policy is
p = (1 + α)β − e, (5)
p0 =

> αβ − e if β ≤ β∗,
αβ − e if β > β∗, (6)
ψ(e) =

Q˜1(p(β)) if β ≤ β∗,
Q1(p(β), p0(β)) +Q0(p(β), p0(β)) if β > β
∗,
(7)
t = ψ(e). (8)
Note that when the regulator know β the prices of the simple letters, p, and of
the workshared letters, p0, are equal to the marginal costs of each service, and the
eﬀort is eﬃciently set. Therefore, when bypass occurs the discounts conceded to
the mailers, d = p − p0, is equal to the avoided cost. On the other hand, in each
regime no rent is left to the firm.
The next proposition determines the optimal cut-oﬀ point, β∗. For all values of
β below this level bypassing is not allowed. Taking into account the two equations
in (6) we define eN(β) and eE(β) as the functions for the eﬀort level, when bypassing
is not allowed and when it is.
Proposition 2. For every k, k ∈ [β,β), the optimal cut-oﬀ point is β∗ = k, which
satisfies
U k
k
V ((1 + α)β∗ − eN(β∗))g(k)dk − ψ(eN(β∗))
=
U k
pE−pE0
V ((1 + α)β∗ − eE(β∗))g(k)dk +
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ∗ − eE(β∗) + k)g(k)dk − ψ(eE(β∗)).
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The left-hand side of the equation represents the social surplus when the in-
cumbent provides the sorting to all mailers and the right hand side is the social
surplus when a group of mailers bypass the Post Oﬃce. The equality is satisfied for
β∗ = k. This implies that bypassing is allowed only to the mailers that are more
eﬃcient than the Post Oﬃce. As a consequence, the higher the diﬀerence between
β and k, the greater the proportion of mailers that bypass the sorting.
From the last proposition we also obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. If β > k, bypass occurs, and (1.1) de
E
dk
< 0, de
E
dβ
< 0. (1.2) de
N
dβ
> de
E
dβ
.
The first part of the corollary implies that, given that bypassing occurs, a lower
cost of either firm requires more eﬀort from the Post Oﬃce. The second part states
that a higher cost for the Post Oﬃce implies less eﬀort when bypassing occurs than
when it is prohibited. Therefore, as the amount of eﬀort required depends on the
quantity produced, the Post Oﬃce will need to put in less eﬀort when bypassing
is not allowed. This occurs for two reasons. First of all, because an increase in β
reduces even more the demand when bypassing is prohibited. And second, because
when β increases, more mailers find the bypass option profitable. This implies that
the quantity of single-piece letters is smaller and the quantity of workshared letters
is greater. Again, as the eﬀort required depends on the quantity produced of each
service, the first eﬀect is reinforced.
3.2 Bypass with asymmetric information
We next analyse the more complex case where the regulator can not observe the
sub-cost of the firm. Thus, we consider the situation where there exists a cut-oﬀ
point β∗ ∈ [β,β] such that if β ≤ β∗ the incumbent supplies the single-piece letters
to all mailers, and if β > β∗ the eﬃcient mailers provide the sorting by themselves.
The constraints imposed on the regulator’s maximization program are of two
kinds, and are shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. A policy p(β), p0(β), e(β), t(β), β∗, is "incentive compatible" if
and only if it satisfies
U˙(β) = −(α+ 1)ψ(e(β)) if β ≤ β∗, (9)
U˙(β) = −(α+ Q1(p(β), p0(β))
Q0(p(β), p0(β)) +Q1(p(β), p0(β))
)ψ(e(β)) if β > β∗, (10)
lim U(β)
β → β∗−
=
lim U(β)
β → β∗+
: U(β) is continuous at β∗, (11)
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and the policy satisfies the Post Oﬃce’s "individual rationality constraint" if
and only if it satisfies U(β) ≥ 0.
Note that when Q0(p(β), p0(β)) is not zero,
Q1(p(β),p0(β))
Q0(p(β),p0(β))+Q1(p(β),p0(β))
< 1. That
is, the informational rent necessary to make the Post Oﬃce reveal the true value
of β is higher when β ≤ β∗ (no bypass) than when β > β∗ (bypass).
In view of Proposition 3, we can now write the program for the overall max-
imization of expected welfare. Take an arbitrary cut-oﬀ point β∗. Using U(β)
to simplify t(β) we obtain two separate problems. When β ≤ β∗ the regulator
considers
max
U(β);p(β),
p0(β),e(β)
] β∗
β
{
] k
k
V (p)g(k)dk − (1− λ)UN − ψ(eN)
+(p− (1 + α)β + e)
] k
k
q(p)g(k)dk}f(β)dβ,
s.t. U˙(β) = −(α+ 1)ψ(e(β)), U(β∗) = U∗, p(β)− p0(β)− k < 0,
where U∗ is the incumbent’s reservation utility in the problem β > β∗, when
the cost is β∗. When β > β∗, the regulator considers the following problem
max
U(β);p(β),
p0(β),e(β)
] β
β∗
{
] k
p−p0
V (p)g(k)dk +
] p−p0
k
V (p0 + k)g(k)dk
−(1− λ)UE − ψ(eE) + (p− (1 + α)β + e)
] k
p−p0
q(p)g(k)dk
+(p0 − αβ + e)
] p−p0
k
q(p0 + k)g(k)dk}f(β)dβ + Φ(β∗, U∗),
s.t. U˙(β) = −(α+ Q1(p(β), p0(β))
Q0(p(β), p0(β)) +Q1(p(β), p0(β))
)ψ(e(β)),
U(β) = 0, p(β)− p0(β)− k ≥ 0.
where Φ(β∗, U∗) is the value of the first problem. As in the complete information
case, we solve the problem in two stages. We first solve the optimal policy for each
control problem. Afterwards, we find the optimal cut oﬀ point, β∗.
Proposition 4. The optimal policy for p(β), p0(β), e(β) and U(β) when β ≤ β∗ is
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p(β) = (1 + α)β − e(β), (12)
p0(β) > (1 + α)β − e(β)− k, (13)
ψ(e(β)) = Q˜1(p(β))− (1− λ)
F (β)
f(β)
(α+ 1)ψ(e(β)), (14)
U(β) = (α+ 1)
] β∗
β
ψ(e(β˜))dβ˜, (15)
and, when β > β∗, is
p(β) = (1 + α)β − e(β) + (1− λ)F (β)
f(β)
Q0
(Q0 +Q1)2η˜0
ψ(e(β)), (16)
p0(β) = αβ − e(β)− (1− λ)
F (β)
f(β)
Q1
(Q0 +Q1)2η˜1
ψ(e(β)), (17)
ψ(e(β)) = Q1(p(β), p0(β)) +Q0(p(β), p0(β)) (18)
−(1− λ)F (β)
f(β)
(α+
Q1
Q0 +Q1
)ψ(e(β)), (19)
U(β) =
] β
β∗
(α+
Q1
Q0 +Q1
)ψ(e(β˜))dβ˜. (20)
where we have used Q1 = Q1(p(β), p0(β)) and Q0 = Q0(p(β), p0(β)). On the
other hand, η˜0 and η˜1, which are defined in the appendix, are the price superelas-
ticities for the complete and the workshared services. Superelasticities are modified
elasticities of demand which account for possible substitution or complementarity
between services.16
Comparing the two regimes, it follows that asymmetric information does not
create a distortion in the prices in the first regime, but it does so in the second.
Indeed, when β > β∗ the price of the single-piece letters is raised above the marginal
cost, and the price of the workshared letters is reduced below the marginal cost in
such a way as to keep total net revenues at zero. Since the regulator is unable to
16Notice that these superelasticities are not exactly defined as in Laﬀont and Tirole (1994).
Indeed, in our model when the aggregate demand functions are independent, superelasticities are
equal to 1. This does not occur when there are cross price eﬀects.
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observe the firm’s sub-cost, she needs to give some informational advantage to the
firm. As this rent is more important for the complete service than for the sorted,
the regulator increases the price of the first service and reduces the price of the
second. With this policy, total revenue is kept at zero, and welfare is maximized.
In contrast, when β ≤ β∗ the regulator does not require to know the cost of the
first stage of the sorting. As a consequence, it is not necessary to distort the prices.
Finally, observe that the eﬀort is reduced for β > β in order to reduce the rent.
This occurs in the two regimes, when worksharing is allowed and when it is not.
Finally, let us notice that the worksharing discount conceded to the consumer
that bypasses the Post Oﬃce is given by d = pE − pE0 . The next corollary states
when bypassing occurs.
Corollary 2. A consumer with type k bypasses the Post Oﬃce when
d = β + (1− λ)F (β)
f(β)
Q0η˜1 +Q1η˜0
(Q0 +Q1)2η˜1η˜0
ψ(e(β)) > k.
Therefore, when bypassing is allowed, even mailers that are less eﬃcient than
the Post Oﬃce find it profitable to bypass. This is a direct consequence of the
distortion in prices.
The previous Corollary shows which mailers will pre-sort their letters when
bypass is allowed. The next proposition determines the cut-oﬀ point above which
bypass will be allowed. This further characterizes the optimal policy.
Proposition 5. For k ∈ [β,β), the optimal cut-oﬀ point, β∗, for β∗ ∈ (k, k),
satisfies
U k
k
V ((1 + α)β∗ − eN(β∗))g(k)dk −
U k
pE−pE0
V ((pE(β∗))g(k)dk
−
U pE−pE0
k
V (pE0 (β
∗) + k)g(k)dk = ψ(eN(β∗))− ψ(eE(β))
+(1− λ)F (β
∗)
f(β∗) {(α+ 1)ψ(eN(β∗))− (α+ Q1Q0+Q1 )ψ(eE(β∗))}.
The left-hand side of the equation represents the diﬀerence in social surplus
when the Post Oﬃce supplies the complete service to all mailers and when a group
of mailers bypass the sorting facilities. The right-hand side represents the diﬀerence
in rents that are given to the Post Oﬃce in each case. For the optimal cut-oﬀ point,
β∗, both sides are negative and equal.
14
The next proposition clarifies which mailers will bypass the Post Oﬃce. In
particular, it studies who will pre-sort the letters when the Post Oﬃce and the
mailers have the same level of eﬃciency.
Proposition 6. Given k ∈ [β, β], β∗(k) satisfies: (6.1) β∗(k) > k for every k ∈
[β,β]; (6.2) β∗(k) is continuous; and (6.3) β∗(k) is concave.
The proposition shows that the prohibition of bypassing occurs more often
with asymmetric information than when the regulator knows the firm’s sub-costs.
Condition (6.1) states that the Post Oﬃce produces the sorting to all mailers even
when it is less eﬃcient than the most eﬃcient type, k. This is an important
conclusion. Asymmetric information implies that the Post Oﬃce is favored. On
the other hand, the concavity of β∗(k) implies that the bias in favor of the Post
Oﬃce is less strong when the mailers are less eﬃcient.
The intuition behind the Proposition is that, when the regulator allows the
bypass, the prices are distorted away from Ramsey prices, so as to give an informa-
tional rent to the firm. As the distortion of prices reduces the welfare, if the cost
advantage of the mailers is not important the optimal policy consist of forbidding
the bypass. The regulator must spend on informational rents in order to force the
Post Oﬃce to report the true value of β. This occurs, in both cases, when the Post
Oﬃce supplies the complete service to all mailers, and when a group of mailers pro-
vide the sorting themselves. Moreover, the informational rent that must be given
to the firm decreases as more mailers bypass the sorting. However, when β(k) = k
the informational rents are equal in the two regimes. Given that bypassing distorts
the prices away from Ramsey prices it must be that β∗ > k. To sum up, there is
a trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, bypassing distorts the prices. On the other hand,
it reduces the firm’s informational rent. For β∗(k) = k bypassing is prohibited,
because although the informational rents given to the Post Oﬃce are the same in
the two regimes, the distortion in prices reduces social welfare.
The next lemma characterizes further the regulator’s solution.
Lemma 3. If k > β, then (1.1) pE0 (β
∗) + k < pN(β∗), and (1.2) eE(β∗) > eN(β∗).
When β moves from β∗ to β∗+", the cost of sorting suddenly decreases from β∗
to k. On the other hand, eﬀort suddenly increases, which also decreases the cost.
Therefore, when bypassing is allowed, the two eﬀects decrease the price. In spite
of this, the consumer’s surplus is a continuous function in β.
Corollary 4. The ex-post regulator’s payoﬀ is a continuous function of β.
If t is interpreted as a transfer paid by consumers, it follows from this corollary
that the net consumer’s surplus, V (p(β)) − t(β), is also a continuous function in
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β, and therefore, the lower price paid when bypassing occurs is compensated for
exactly a higher fixed charge.
Finally, notice that Proposition 6 relies on the uniform distribution of k consid-
ered in Assumption 1. The next proposition shows that this result can be reversed.
In particular, we consider the case where the unit cost of sorting for all mailers is
k.
Proposition 7. Given k ∈ [β,β], when all mailers have the type k, then β∗(k) < k.
The intuition behind this result is that when all mailers bypass the Post Oﬃce,
the distortion of prices disappears because the regulator has perfect information
about the total cost of the workshared service, and because there is only one service
sold. On the other hand, even when all mailers bypass the Post Oﬃce the regulator
does not know which is the true value of β and the eﬀort. Therefore, she must give
some rent to encourage eﬀort. However, the rent that she must give to the Post
Oﬃce is lower when all mailers bypass the firm.
This result is important because it gives an inclination into what will occur
in the presence of a competitor of the Post Oﬃce that provides the sorting to all
mailers. Indeed, if we consider the situation where all mailers have type k and
delegate the sorting to one of them, the mailer that provides the sorting must
access the Post Oﬃce network to distribute all the correspondence. In this case,
the result that β∗(k) < k implies that there is a pro-competitive bias if favor of
the competitor. Hence, in this situation even if the competitor is less eﬃcient than
the Post Oﬃce the optimal policy consist of allowing him to provide the sorting.
In the next section we study the problem in more detail.
4 The access charge problem
In this section, we extend the previous framework to consider that the postal
operator has one competitor in the sorting activity. For this analysis we closely
follow the work of De Fraja (1999) about the access charge in the telecommunication
industry. Our analysis adapts his model to the postal sector, and we obtain a similar
conclusion than him. Moreover, it is very interesting to compare the worksharing
discount that we have obtained in the previous section with the optimal access
discount.
It is now common in many countries that new postal firms operate a local
network. However, they generally rely on the Post Oﬃce network for delivering
non-local letters. The competitors collect the bulk correspondence of some mailers
and separate the local and non-local letters. Finally, they distribute their local
mail through their network, and pay an access charge to the Post Oﬃce for the
delivery of the rest of the letters.
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As in the previous section, we restrict our analysis to the non-local letters. Fur-
thermore, to facilitate the comparison with the optimal policy for the worksharing
discount, we make the simplifying assumption that the competitor only provides
the first stage of the sorting. The access charge that the competitor pays to the
Post Oﬃce consists of the price of the letters, p, minus a worksharing discount, a.
That is, p0 = p− a.
We consider that the potential competitor has a constant average and marginal
cost of ξ for supplying the sorting, where ξ ∈ (β,β]. The mailers and the Post
Oﬃce has the same cost structure than before. β is distributed in [β,β]. But,
in order to simplify the model, we consider that β = β∗, where β∗ is the optimal
cutt-oﬀ point of the previous section, when there is perfect information and when
there exists asymmetric information. With this simplification we guarantee that
at least a group of mailers will find it profitable to bypass the Post Oﬃce.
As in the previous section, the regulator observes expost the total cost of the
two firms, but she can not infer the Post Oﬃce’s sub-costs. On the other hand,
we consider that the regulator maximizes a welfare function, that in this case
incorporates the competitor’s profit, π. This modifies assumption 4 as follows.
Assumption 7. The regulator’s welfare function is given by the weighted sum of
the consumer’s surplus, and the firms’ profit, U and π, reduced by any direct transfer
of public funds to the Post Oﬃce, t:
W =
U k
p−p0 V (p)g(k)dk +
U p−p0
k
V (p0 + k)g(k)dk + λ(U + π)− t, (21)
The firms’ profits can take two diﬀerent forms. If the Post Oﬃce supplies the
sorting to the ineﬃcient mailers we have
UN = (p− (1 + α)β + e)
] k
p−p0
q(p)g(k)dk (22)
+(p0 − αβ + e)
] p−p0
k
q(p0 + k)g(k)dk + t− ψ(e), (23)
πN = 0. (24)
In this case the competitor’s profit is zero, because it stays out of the market.
When the competitor supplies the first stage of the sorting to the ineﬃcient mailers,
the firms’ profits are
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UE = (p0 − αβ + e)
] k
k
q(p)g(k)dk + t− ψ(e), (25)
πE = (p− p0 − ξ)
] k
p−p0
q(p)g(k)dk. (26)
Our hypothesis on the observability of costs implies that the regulator is able
to prevent the entrant from obtaining any profit from his activities.
4.1 The optimal access discount
As in the bypass problem, we first study the model given that the regulator knows
β. In order to determine the optimal access policy, we consider the case where there
is no entry separately from the case where a competitor provides the sorting. We
then determine the optimal cut-oﬀ point in a second stage. This point represents
the value of the Post Oﬃce’s sorting cost under which entry is not allowed.
To ensure the suﬃciency of the first order conditions, we introduce the following
assumption.
Assumption 8. For all admissible p, p0 and e: ψ(e) > −Q1(p(β), p0(β)) −
Q0(p(β), p0(β)).
Notice that in this assumption, Q1(p(β), p0(β)) and Q0(p(β), p0(β)) represent
the aggregate supply of the complete and the sorted mail when bypassing is possible.
The optimal policy is defined in the following proposition. The proofs can be
found in the Appendix.
Proposition 8. When the regulator know β, and the cut-oﬀ point is ξ, the optimal
policy is
p =

(1 + α)β − e if β ≤ ξ,
ξ + αβ − e if β > ξ, (27)
p0 = αβ − e, (28)
ψ(e) = Q1(p(β), p0(β)) +Q0(p(β), p0(β)) (29)
a =

> p− p0 if β ≤ ξ,
= p− p0 if β > ξ,
(30)
t = ψ(e). (31)
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Note that the prices of the single-piece letters and of the pre-sort letters are
equal to the marginal costs, and eﬀort is eﬃciently set. On the other hand, in
each regime no rent is left for the firms. Finally, let us notice that a = ξ when
β > ξ. That is, when the regulator knows the entrant’s costs, the optimal policy
does not consist of fixing a discount equal to the cost saved by the Post Oﬃce. On
the contrary, the optimal policy maintains the entrant’s profit equal to zero.
4.2 Access with asymmetric information
In this section we analyze the case where the regulator cannot observe the firm’s
sub-costs. As in the perfect information case, we consider the situation where there
is a cut-oﬀ point β∗ ∈ [β, β] such that if β ≤ β∗ the Post Oﬃce supplies the first
stage of the sorting to the ineﬃcient mailers, and if β > β∗ the competitor supplies
the sorting to the ineﬃcient mailers.
The following proposition shows two kinds of restrictions that must satisfy the
regulator’s maximization problem.
Proposition 9. A policy p(β), p0(β), e(β), t(β), β∗, is "incentive compatible" if
and only if it satisfies
U˙(β) = −(α+ Q1(p(β), p0(β))
Q0(p(β), p0(β)) +Q1(p(β), p0(β))
)ψ(e(β)) if β ≤ β∗,
(32)
U˙(β) = −αψ(e(β)) if β > β∗, (33)
lim U(β)
β → β∗−
=
lim U(β)
β → β∗+
: U(β) is continuous at β∗,. (34)
and the policy satisfies the Post Oﬃce’s "individual rationality constraint" if
and only if it satisfies U(β) ≥ 0.
Note that the informational rents necessary to make the Post Oﬃce reveal the
true value of β are higher when β ≤ β∗ (no entry) than when β > β∗ (entry).
This occurs because when the competitor enters, the regulator is able to know
the Post Oﬃce’s sub-cost at the second stage of the sorting. Indeed, when the
competitor enters the Post Oﬃce only provides this activity. In spite of this, the
regulator cannot observe the incumbent’s productivity and eﬀort. Therefore, it is
still necessary to give some incentives to the incumbent.
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Taking into account the previous result, we can now write the program for the
overall maximization of the expected welfare. Take an arbitrary cut-oﬀ point β∗.
When β ≤ β∗ the regulator considers
max
U(β);p(β),p0(β)
a(β),e(β)
] β∗
β
{
] k
p−p0
V (p)g(k)dk +
] p−p0
k
V (p0 + k)g(k)dk
−(1− λ)UN − ψ(eN) + (p− (1 + α)β + e)
] k
p−p0
q(p)g(k)dk
+(p0 − αβ + e)
] p−p0
k
q(p0 + k)g(k)dk}f(β)dβ
s.t. U˙(β) = −(α+ Q1(p(β), p0(β))
Q0(p(β), p0(β)) +Q1(p(β), p0(β))
)ψ(e(β)),
U(β∗) = U∗, p(β)− p0(β)− a(β) < 0.
where U∗ is the incumbent’s reservation utility in the problem β > β∗, when the
cost is β∗. On the other hand, when β > β∗, the regulator considers the problem
max
U(β);p(β),p0(β)
a(β),e(β)
] β
β∗
{
] k
p−p0
V (p)g(k)dk +
] p−p0
k
V (p0 + k)g(k)dk
−(1− λ)UE − ψ(eE) + (p0 − αβ + e)
] k
k
q(p)g(k)dk
+λ(p− p0 − ξ)
] k
p−p0
q(p)g(k)dk}f(β)dβ + Φ(β∗, U∗),
s.t. U˙(β) = −αψ(e(β)), U(β) = 0, p(β)− p0(β)− a(β) ≥ 0.
As in the complete information case, in order to find the optimal policy we solve
the regulator’s problem in two stages. Firstly, we solve the optimal policy for each
control problem. Then, we will find the optimal cut oﬀ point, β∗.
Proposition 10. The optimal policy for p(β), p0(β), a(β), e(β) and U(β) when
β ≤ β∗ is
20
p(β) = (1 + α)β − e(β) + (1− λ)F (β)
f(β)
Q0
(Q0 +Q1)2η˜0
ψ(e(β)), (35)
p0(β) = αβ − e(β)− (1− λ)
F (β)
f(β)
Q1
(Q0 +Q1)2η˜1
ψ(e(β)), (36)
ψ(e(β)) = Q1(p(β), p0(β)) +Q0(p(β), p0(β))
−(1− λ)F (β)
f(β)
(α+
Q1
Q0 +Q1
)ψ(e(β)), (37)
a(β) > p(β)− p0(β), (38)
U(β) =
] β∗
β
(α+
Q1
Q0 +Q1
)ψ(e(β˜))dβ˜, (39)
and, when β > β∗, is
p(β) = αβ + ξ − e(β), (40)
p0(β) = αβ − e(β), (41)
ψ(e(β)) = Q1(p(β), p0(β)) +Q0(p(β), p0(β))
−(1− λ)F (β)
f(β)
αψ(e(β)), (42)
a(β) = p(β)− p0(β), (43)
U(β) = α
] β
β∗
ψ(e(β˜))dβ˜, (44)
where we have used Q1 = Q1(p(β), p0(β)) and Q0 = Q0(p(β), p0(β)). On the
other hand, η˜0 and η˜1, are price supereslasticities, which are defined as in the
previous section.
Comparing the two regimes, it follows that asymmetric information creates a
distortion in the prices of the first regime, but not in the second. As we have seen
in section 3, when β < β∗, the regulator raises the price of the single-piece letters
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over the marginal cost and reduces the price of the workshared letters in such a
way as to keep total net revenues at zero. This allows the regulator to give less
informational rents to the Post Oﬃce. In contrast, when β ≥ β∗ it is not necessary
to distort the prices because the regulator knows which is the cost of the second
stage of the sorting. On the other hand, observe that eﬀort is reduced for β > β
when entry is allowed and when it is not.
We now determine the optimal cut-oﬀ point, above which entry is allowed.
Proposition 11. For ξ ∈ (β,β], the optimal cut-oﬀ point, β∗, for β∗ ∈ (β, β),
implies
U k
pN−pN0
V (pN(β∗))g(k)dk +
U pN−pN0
k
V (pN0 (β
∗) + k)g(k)dk
−
U k
pE−pE0
V (ξ + αβ∗ − eE(β∗))g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ∗ − eE(β∗) + k)g(k)dk
= ψ(eN(β∗))− ψ(eE(β∗)) + (1− λ)F (β
∗)
f(β∗) {(α+ Q1Q0+Q1 )ψ(eN(β˜∗))− αψ(eE(β˜∗))}.
The left hand side of the equation represents the diﬀerence in social surplus
when the Post Oﬃce provides the sorting to the less eﬃcient mailers and when it
is the entrant who provides them this service. The right-hand side of the equation
represents the diﬀerence in rents that are given to the Post Oﬃce in each case. For
the cut-oﬀ point β∗ both sides are equal.
Finally, we study in which situation the Post Oﬃce will be allowed to provide
the sorting to the mailers. In particular, we analyze who will be in charge of
providing the sorting when the Post Oﬃce and its competitor are equally eﬃcient.
Proposition 12. Given ξ ∈ [β,β], let β∗(ξ) be the optimal cut-oﬀ point. Then
β∗(ξ) satisfies: (11.1) β∗(β) = β; (11.2) β∗(ξ) < ξ for every ξ ∈ (β,β]; (11.3)
β∗(ξ) is continuous.
As in De Fraja (1999), the proposition shows that with asymmetric information
there is a bias against the Post Oﬃce.17 Despite being equally eﬃcient than the
entrant, the Post Oﬃce is not allowed to supply the first stage of the sorting.
The intuition behind this conclusion is that the entry of a competitor reduces
the informational rents that must be given to the Post Oﬃce, and does not distort
17In fact, our result can be seen as an extension of De Fraja (1999), when there are heterogeneous
consumers. It is important to emphasize that our representation of the consumers does not modify
its interesting conclusion, when there is a uniform distribution of k.
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the prices from marginal cost pricing. Therefore, entry of an ineﬃcient competitor
may be allowed, because although it reduces the productive eﬃciency, it increases
the allocative eﬃciency and improves the ability of the regulator to observe the
Post Oﬃce’s cost. This result contrasts with the optimal worksharing discount
that we have seen in Section 3.2. In that case, the Post Oﬃce is protected because
bypassing implies the distortion from marginal cost pricing.
Finally, it is important to remember again that the result of the previous propo-
sition is obtained with a uniform distribution of the mailers. With a diﬀerent
distribution this result can be modified. The next proposition shows an example.
Proposition 13. Given k ∈ [β,β], when all mailers have the type k, then β∗(ξ) =
ξ.
Intuitively, if all the mailers have the type k, all of them will bypass the Post
Oﬃce and will not use the competitor. On the other hand, observe that when it
increases the number of mailers close to k the pro-competitive bias against the Post
Oﬃce is reduced.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper we have analyzed the optimal access policy in a liberalized postal
market. In particular, we have studied how must be established the discounts
over the price of the letters that receive those agents that undertake some sorting
activities that were traditionally provided by the Post Oﬃce. We distinguish two
types of worksharing discounts. The discounts conceded to the mailers that bypass
some sorting facilities of the Post Oﬃce’s network. And the discounts granted to
the firms that carry out some stages of the sorting, but that have to relay on the
Post Oﬃce’s network to deliver their non-local correspondence. Apparently, the two
types of discounts should be determined in the same way, because in both cases the
discount has to take into account the cost avoided to the Post Oﬃce. The literature
about worksharing discounts shows that this is indeed the case when the regulator
has perfect information about the Post Oﬃce sub-costs. However, we show that
this result can no longer be held in our model with asymmetric information.
When there is asymmetric information between the regulator and the Post
Oﬃce, the regulator has to concede informational rents to the firm to encourage it to
make some eﬀort. When there are some agents (mailers or firms) that pre-sort their
letters, the informational rents that must be given to the firm are reduced, but the
prices of the letters maybe distorted with respect to marginal cost pricing. When
the agent that pre-sort their letters is a group of mailers that are as eﬃcient as the
Post Oﬃce, the informational rents that must be given to the Post Oﬃce is equal
when the regulator allows the mailers to pre-sort their mail and when it forbids it.
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However, if only a group of mailers (not all of them) pre-sort their correspondence,
the informational rents conceded to the Post Oﬃce distort the tariﬀs away from
marginal cost pricing. As a result, the optimal policy is to forbid the bypass of the
mailers. That is, only when the diﬀerence between the mailers costs and the Post
Oﬃce’s is suﬃciently large, should the regulator allow the bypass. A diﬀerent case
is when all the mailers have more or less the same sorting cost. In this situation,
the regulator may allow bypassing by the ineﬃcient mailers when the diﬀerence
with the Postal Oﬃce’s cost is suﬃciently small.
In the access discount problem the optimal policy is diﬀerent and may consist of
allowing the entry of firms that are less eﬃcient than the Post Oﬃce. This occurs
because entry reduces the informational rents that must be given to the Post Oﬃce.
On the other hand, entry permits to observe the Post Oﬃce’s cost in the second
stage of the sorting. As a consequence, it is possible to establish a marginal cost
pricing policy. As we have shown, however, this pro-competitive bias in favor of
the entrant is reduced when the main part of the mailers is more eﬃcient than the
Post Oﬃce.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that with asymmetric informa-
tion the optimal worksharing discount conceded to the mailers and the optimal
access discount conceded to the entrants in the postal market have opposite char-
acteristics. While in the first case the regulator should restrict the bypass, in the
second the regulator should take a pro-competitive attitude. This may support the
view of the postal authorities of some countries that consists of fixing the access
discounts slightly lower than the Post Oﬃce’s avoided cost, and delegating to the
regulated Post Oﬃce the responsibility of fixing the worksharing discounts.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The welfare function for any given cut-oﬀ point can be
written as two separate problems. When we eliminate t using the definition of U ,
we can write the function as follows:
max
U(β);p(β),
p0(β),e(β)
U k
k
V (p)g(k)dk − (1− λ)UN − ψ(eN) + (p− (1 + α)β + e)
U k
k
q(p)g(k)dk
when β ≤ β∗, and
max
U(β);p(β),
p0(β),e(β)
U k
p−p0 V (p)g(k)dk +
U p−p0
k
V (p0 + k)g(k)dk − (1− λ)UE − ψ(eE)
+(p− (1 + α)β + e)
U k
p−p0 q(p)g(k)dk + (p0 − αβ + e)
U p−p0
k
q(p0 + k)g(k)dk,
when β > β∗. Consider the following definitions:
Q˜1(p(β)) =
U k
k
q(p)g(k)dk; Q1(p(β), p0(β)) = q(p)[1−G(p(β)− p0(β))];
Q0(p(β), p0(β)) =
U p−p0
k
q(p0(β) + k)g(k)dk.
Taking this into account, the two problems can be solved in the standard man-
ner, giving the policy of the statement.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given k, k ∈ [β,β), define G(β˜) as the social welfare given
an arbitrary β˜ as the cut-oﬀ point, and the optimal policies above and below it,
given by Proposition 1.
G(β˜) =
U β˜
β
[
U k
k
V ((1 + α)β − eN(β))g(k)dk − ψ(eN(β))]f(β)dβ
+
U β
β˜
[
U k
pE−pE0
V ((1 + α)β − eE(β))g(k)dk +
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ − eE(β) + k)g(k)dk − ψ(eE(β))]f(β)dβ
Diﬀerentiation yields
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G(β˜)
f(β˜)
= [
U k
k
V ((1 + α)β − eN(β))g(k)dk − ψ(eN(β))]
−[
U k
pE−pE0
V ((1 + α)β − eE(β))g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ − eE(β) + k)g(k)dk − ψ(eE(β))].
Note that as G(β) ≥ 0 and G(β) < 0, in view of the continuity of G, the point
β = k satisfies G(β∗) = 0, and G(β∗) ≥ 0. This establishes the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. The regulator can only observe total cost. Therefore, if the
incumbent wants to misreport β˜ when the value of the cost is β, it will need to
exert an eﬀort’s level such that the actual cost is the same as would be observed if β˜
where the true cost parameter. If no mailer workshare their letters this is satisfied
for
(α+ 1)β˜ − e(β˜) = (α+ 1)β − x,
x = e(β˜) + (β − β˜)(α+ 1).
When a part of the mailers make the sorting, the eﬀort’s level have to satisfy
Q0(p(β), p0(β˜))(αβ˜ − e(β˜)) +Q1(p(β˜), p0(β˜))((1 + α)β˜ − e(β˜))
= Q0(p(β˜), p0(β˜))(αβ − x) +Q1(p(β˜), p0(β˜))((1 + α)β − x)
which, after rearranging gives us
x = e(β˜) + (β − β˜)(α+ Q1(p(β˜),p0(β˜))
Q0(p(β˜),p0(β˜))+Q1(p(β˜),p0(β˜))
).
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the following derivatives for the demands func-
tions:
∂Q1(p, p0)
∂p
= [1−G(p− p0)]
∂q(p)
∂p
− q(p)g(p− p0),
∂Q0(p, p0)
∂p0
=
] β∗
k
∂q(p0 + k)
∂p0
g(k)dk − q(p0 + k)g(p− p0),
∂Q1(p, p0)
∂p0
= q(p)g(p− p0),
∂Q0(p, p0)
∂p
= q(p0 + k)g(p− p0).
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Next, define the following superelasticities
η˜1 =
η1η0 − η01η10
η1η0 + η1η10
, η˜0 =
η0η1 − η10η01
η0η1 + η0η01
.
Taking into account these definitions, and given U∗, the regulator’s problem
for β ≤ β∗ can be solved in the standard manner. The problem for β > β∗ is an
optimal control problem with an initial value, which is represented by Φ(β∗, U∗).
Taking into account the transversability conditions of this problem we solve it, and
the proposition is established.
Proof of Corollary 2. The proof follows directly from condition (16) and (17).
Proof of Proposition 5. In order to proof this proposition we follow the proof of
Proposition 6 in De Fraja (1999). Consider that G(β˜) is the social welfare when
the cut-oﬀ point is arbitrary fixed at β˜, and Proposition 4 determines the optimal
policies for β ≤ β∗ and β > β∗.
G(β˜) =
U β˜
β
[
U k
k
V (pN(β))g(k)dk − (1− λ)U˜N(β, β˜)− ψ(eN(β))]f(β)dβ
+
U β
β˜
[
U k
pE−pE0
V (pE(β))g(k)dk +
U pE−pE0
k
V (pE0 (β) + k)g(k)dk − (1− λ)U˜E(β, β˜)
−ψ(eE(β))]f(β)dβ.
where U˜ j(β, β˜), j = N,E is the profit of the Post Oﬃce, when it has cost β and
the cut-oﬀ point is β˜. After diﬀerentiating this equation we obtain
G(β˜) = {U k
k
V (pN(β))g(k)dk −
U k
pE−pE0
V (pE(β))g(k)dk
−
U pE−pE0
k
V (pE0 (β) + k)g(k)dk − ψ(eN(β)) + ψ(eE(β))}f(β˜)
−(1− λ){U β˜
k
∂UN
∂β˜
f(β)dβ −
U k
β˜
∂UE
∂β˜
f(β)dβ}.
Using the fact that ∂U
N
∂β˜
= (α + 1)ψ(eN(β˜)) and ∂U
E
∂β˜
= (α + Q1
Q0+Q1
)ψ(eN(β˜))
we obtain
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G(β˜) = f(β˜){U k
k
V (pN(β))g(k)dk −
U k
pE−pE0
V (pE(β))g(k)dk
−
U pE−pE0
k
V (pE0 (β) + k)g(k)dk − ψ(eN(β)) + ψ(eE(β))]}
−(1− λ)F (β˜){(α+ 1)ψ(eN(β˜))− (α+ Q1
Q0+Q1
)ψ(eE(β˜))}.
Next we write the following two functions:
G˜(β˜) =
U pE−pE0
k
V ((1 + α)β˜ − eN(β˜))g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ˜ − eE(β˜) + k)g(k)dk
−ψ(eN(β)) + ψ(eE(β))− (1− λ)F (β˜){(α+ 1)ψ(eN(β˜))− (α+ Q1
Q0+Q1
)ψ(eE(β˜))}.
R(β˜, eN , eE) =
U pE−pE0
k
V ((1 + α)β˜ − eN)g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ˜ − eE + k)g(k)dk
−ψ(eN) + ψ(eE)− (1− λ)F (β˜){(α+ 1)ψ(eN)− (α+ Q1
Q1+Q0
)ψ(eE)}.
From the eﬀort optimality condition (14), eN(β) maximizes R(β, eN , eE(β)).
Consequently R(β, eN(β), eE(β)) > R(β, eE(β), eE(β)). Taking this into account
we obtain:
G(β)
f(β)
= R(β, eN(β), eE(β)) > R(β, eE(β), eE(β))
=
U pE−pE0
k
V ((1 + α)β − eE(β))g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ − eE(β) + k)g(k)dk ≥ 0.
This is a strict inequality if β < k. On the other hand, R(β, eE(β), eE(β)) < 0.
Indeed,
R(β, eE(β), eE(β)) =
U pE−pE0
k
V ((1 + α)β − eE(β)))g(k)dk
−
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ − eE(β) + k)g(k)dk − (1− λ)F (β)
f(β)
(1− Q1
Q0+Q1
)ψ(eE(β)) < 0.
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Notice that when β > k the first two terms are negative. Therefore, ifR(β, eE(β), eE(β)) ≥
0 and R(β, eE(β), eE(β)) < 0, in view of the continuity of R, there is a β such that
R(β, eE(β), eE(β)) = 0.
On the other hand, we have seen that G(β) > 0. If G(β) > 0 we have nothing
to prove. Bypass will never occur, and there is not a cut-oﬀ point. Consider that
G(β) < 0. We have
G(β)
f(β)
> G˜(β) = R(β, eN(β), eE(β)) > R(β, eE(β), eE(β)).
Consider the following result. Lemma: G
(β)
f(β)
> G˜(β). Proof of the Lemma:
G(β)
f(β)
− G˜(β) =
U k
pE−pE0
V ((1 + α)β − eN(β))g(k)dk −
U k
pE(β)−pE0
V (pE)g(k)dk
+
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ − eE(β) + k)g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (pE0 (β) + k)g(k)dk ≥ 0.
Indeed, pE and pE0 give zero total revenue. Marginal cost prices also give zero
total revenue. However, consumer’s surplus is maximized, for given revenue require-
ment, by Ramsey prices, in this case marginal cost pricing. Considering assumption
1 and 3, give the statement of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 6. (6.1) Let k > β, and let β∗ be any zero of G(β˜). Lemma
5 implies G˜(β˜) < G
(β˜)
f(β˜)
= 0, and, since G˜(β) =
G(β)
f(β)
, the zero of G˜(β), call
it β˜
∗
, satisfies β˜
∗
< β∗. Now consider 0 = G˜(β˜
∗
) = R(β˜
∗
, eN(β˜
∗
), eE(β˜
∗
)) >
R(β˜
∗
, eE(β˜
∗
), eE(β˜
∗
)). Again, this follows from the fact that eN(β˜
∗
) maximises
R(β˜, eN , eE(β˜
∗
)). Therefore the zero of R(β˜
∗
, eE(β˜), eE(β˜
∗
)), ˜˜β, satisfies ˜˜β
∗
< β˜
∗
.
Finally, R(˜˜β
∗
, eE(˜˜β
∗
), eE(˜˜β
∗
)) = 0 implies
U pE−pE0
k
V ((1 + α)˜˜β
∗
− eE(˜˜β
∗
))g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (α˜˜β
∗
− eE(˜˜β
∗
) + k)g(k)dk
= (1− λ)[F (
˜˜
β
∗
)
f(˜˜β
∗
)
](1− Q1
Q0+Q1
)ψ(eE(˜˜β
∗
)) = 0,
and hence ˜˜β
∗
= k. Indeed, when R(k, eE(k), eE(k)) = 0, Q0(p(β), p0(β)) = 0.
Therefore, β∗ > k.
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(6.2) Consider the second derivative of G. Write G(β) = f(β)[G
(β)
f(β)
], and
G(β) = f (β)[G
(β)
f(β)
]+f(β)( d
dβ
)(G
(β)
f(β)
). The first term is zero at a stationary point.
Now consider
( d
dβ
)(G
(β)
f(β)
) = −(1− λ)( d
dβ
)(F (β)
f(β)
)[(α+ 1)ψ(eN(β))− (α+ Q1
Q1+Q0
)ψ(eE(β))] < 0,
at every stationary point of G. As a consequence, there can be at most one
such point, establishing the continuity of β∗(k).
(6.3) Total diﬀerentiation of G gives G(β∗)dβ∗ + (∂G
(β∗)
∂k
) > 0.
Now (∂G
(β∗)
∂k
) = q(pE0 (β
∗)+k), again the eﬀort optimality condition implies that
the terms in (∂e
E(β∗)
∂k
) vanish. If we diﬀerentiate dβ
∗
dk
with respect to k we obtain,
d2β∗
dk2
= − 1
G(β∗)2 [
∂2G(β∗)
∂k2
G(β∗)− ∂G
(β∗)
∂k
∂G(β∗)
∂k
] > 0.
Indeed,
d2β∗
dk2
= q(pE0 (β
∗) + k) < 0,
∂G(β∗)
∂k
= f(β∗)(α+ 1)(1− λ) d
dβ
(
F (β∗)
f(β∗)
)ψ(eE(β∗))
deE(β∗)
dk
< 0,
deE(β∗)
dk
=
Q

1(p
E(β∗))
ψ(eE(β∗)) + (α+ Q1
Q0+Q1
)(1− λ)(F (β
∗)
f(β∗) )ψ
(eE(β∗)) +Q

1(p
E(β∗))
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. (1.1) Clearly pN(β) ≤ pE0 (β)+k. If pN(β) < pE0 (β)+k, there is
nothing to prove. Let β0 be such that p
N(β0) = p
E
0 (β0) + k. At this point we have
that pN(β0) < p
E(β0), and from the eﬀort optimality condition e
N(β0) < e
E(β0).
We also have that de
N (β0)
dβ
< de
E(β0)
dβ
. Therefore, dp
N (β0)
dβ
= (1 + α) − [de
E(β0)
dβ
] >
α− [de
E(β0)
dβ
] >
dpE0 (β0)
dβ
, which implies that β > β0 implies p
N(β) > pE0 (β) + k.
Next, notice that for β = k, eN = eE implies that pN > pE0 + k. Therefore, for
β∗ > k we have that pN > pE0 + k. This implies that, β0 < β
∗.
(1.2) Notice that eN(β0) = e
E(β0) = e for β0 = k. Therefore, β0 < β
∗.
Proof of Corollary 4. Define tN(β∗), UN(β∗), and eN(β∗). The corollary estab-
lishes that
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S(pN(β∗)) + λUN(β∗)− tN(β∗) = S(pE(β∗)) + λUE(β∗)− tE(β∗).
Using the definition of t, we obtain
S(pN(β∗))− (1− λ)UN(β∗)− ψ(eN(β∗)) = S(pE(β∗))− (1− λ)UE(β∗)− ψ(eE(β∗)).
Taking into acount Proposition 3, and substituting from Proposition 5 yields
(1− λ)F (β
∗)
f(β∗) [(α+ 1)ψ
(eN(β∗))− (α+ Q1
Q0+Q1
)ψ(eE(β∗))] = 0.
This is satisfied because U is continuous at β∗.
Proof of Proposition 7. If all mailers have the type k, then from the proof of
proposition 5 we have that G
(β)
f(β)
< G˜(β). In this case, since eE(β˜) minimises
R(β, eN(β), eE) for every β ∈ [β,β], it follows that
G(β)
f(β)
< G˜(β) = R(β, eN(β), eE(β)) < R(β, eN(β), eN(β)).
Using the same approach than in proof of proposition (6.1), we have that β∗ <
k.
Proof of Proposition 8. The welfare function for an arbitrary cut-oﬀ point β˜ can
be split into two separate problems. When β ≤ β˜,
max
U(β);p(β),
p0(β),e(β)
U k
p−p0 V (p)g(k)dk +
U p−p0
k
V (p0 + k)g(k)dk − (1− λ)UN − ψ(eN)
+(p− (1 + α)β + e)
U k
p−p0 q(p)g(k)dk + (p0 − αβ + e)
U p−p0
k
q(p0 + k)g(k)dk,
and when β > β˜
max
U(β);p(β),
p0(β),e(β)
U k
p−p0 V (p)g(k)dk +
U p−p0
k
V (p0 + k)g(k)dk − (1− λ)UE − ψ(eE)
+λ(p− a− ξ)
U k
p−p0 q(p)g(k)dk + (p0 − αβ + e)
U p−p0
k
q(p0 + k)g(k)dk
+(a− αβ + e)
U k
pp0
q(p)g(k)dk,
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Consider the following definitions:
Q1(p(β), p0(β)) = q(p)[1−G(p(β)− p0(β))]
Q0(p(β), p0(β)) =
U p−p0
k
q(p0(β) + k)g(k)dk.
Taking this into account, the two problems can be solved in the standard man-
ner. Afterwards, we find that the cut oﬀ is βˆ = ξ.
Proof of Proposition 9. Following the same analysis than in Proposition 3, if the
competitor stays out of the market the Post Oﬃce eﬀort’s level satisfies,
x = e(β˜) + (β − β˜)(α+ Q1(p(β˜),p0(β˜))
Q0(p(β˜,p0(β˜))+Q1(p(β˜),p0(β˜))
).
Indeed, this is the same condition that we had in Section 3, when a part of the
mailers make the sorting. On the other hand, when the competitor provides the
first stage of the sorting to the ineﬃcient mailers we have
αβ˜ − e(β˜) = αβ − x,
x = e(β˜) + (β − β˜)α.
Proof of Proposition 10. We solve the two problems as in Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 11. Fix ξ. Consider that G(β˜) is the social welfare when the
cut-oﬀ point is arbitrary fixed at β˜, and Proposition 10 determines the optimal
policies for β ≤ β∗ and β > β∗.
G(β˜) =
U β˜
β
[
U k
pN−pN0
V (pN(β))g(k)dk +
U pN−pN0
k
V (pN0 (β) + k)g(k)dk
−(1− λ)U˜N(β, β˜)− ψ(eN(β))]f(β)dβ +
U β
β˜
[
U k
pE−pE0
V (pE(β))g(k)dk
+
U pE−pE0
k
V (pE0 (β) + k)g(k)dk − (1− λ)U˜E(β, β˜)− ψ(eE(β))]f(β)dβ,
where U˜ j(β, β˜), j = N,E is the profit of the Post Oﬃce when it has cost β and
the cut-oﬀ point is β˜. After diﬀerentiating we obtain
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G(β˜) = {U k
pN−pN0
V (pN(β))g(k)dk +
U pN−pN0
k
V (pN0 (β) + k)g(k)dk
−
U k
pE−pE0
V (pE(β))g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (pE0 (β) + k)g(k)dk
−ψ(eN(β)) + ψ(eE(β))}f(β˜)− (1− λ){U β˜
k
∂UN
∂β˜
f(β)dβ −
U k
β˜
∂UE
∂β˜
f(β)dβ}.
Notice that ∂U
N
∂β˜
= (α + Q1
Q0+Q1
)ψ(eN(β˜)) and ∂U
E
∂β˜
= αψ(eE(β˜)). As a conse-
quence,
G(β˜) = f(β˜){U k
pN−pN0
V (pN(β))g(k)dk +
U pN−pN0
k
V (pN0 + k)g(k)dk
−
U k
pE−pE0
V (pE(β))g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (pE0 (β) + k)g(k)dk
−ψ(eN(β)) + ψ(eE(β))}− (1− λ)F (β){(α+ Q1
Q0+Q1
)ψ(eN(β˜))− αψ(eE(β˜))}.
Taking this into account, consider the following functions:
G˜(β˜) =
U k
pN−pN0
V ((1 + α)β − eN(β))g(k)dk +
U pN−pN0
k
V (αβ − eN(β) + k)g(k)dk
−
U k
pE−pE0
V (ξ + αβ − eE(β))g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ − eE(β) + k)g(k)dk
−ψ(eN(β)) + ψ(eE(β))− (1− λ)F (β)
f(β)
{(α+ Q1
Q0+Q1
)ψ(eN(β˜))− αψ(eE(β˜))}.
R(β˜, eN , eE) =
U k
pN−pN0
V ((1 + α)β − eN)g(k)dk +
U pN−pN0
k
V (αβ − eN + k)g(k)dk
−
U k
pE−pE0
V (ξ + αβ − eE)g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ − eE + k)g(k)dk
−ψ(eN)) + ψ(eE)− (1− λ)F (β)
f(β)
{(α+ Q1
Q0+Q1
)ψ(eN)− αψ(eE)}.
Note that, from the eﬀort optimality condition, eN(β)maximisesR(β, eN , eE(β)).
Therefore, R(β, eN(β), eE(β)) > R(β, eE(β), eE(β)) and we can write
33
G(β)
f(β)
= R(β, eN(β), eE(β)) > R(β, eE(β), eE(β))
=
U k
pN−pN0
V ((1 + α)β − eN(β))g(k)dk −
U k
pE−pE0
V (ξ + αβ − eN(β))g(k)dk
−
U pN−pN0
k
V (αβ − eN(β))g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ − eN(β) + k)g(k)dk ≥ 0.
when β = β, pN − pN0 = pE − pE0 . Therefore, if β < k this is a strict inequality.
On the other hand, R(β, eN(β), eN(β)) ≤ 0. Indeed,
R(β, eN(β), eN(β))
=
U k
pN−pN0
V ((1 + α)β − eN(β))g(k)dk −
U k
pE−pE0
V (ξ + αβ − eN(β))g(k)dk
U pN−pN0
k
V (αβ − eN(β))g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (αβ − eN(β) + k)g(k)dk
−(1− λ)F (β)
f(β)
{ Q1
Q0+Q1
ψ(eN(β))} < 0.
Taking into account assumptions 1 and 3 this is negative. Now consider that
G(β)
f(β)
< G˜(β) = R(β, eN(β), eE(β)) < R(β, eN(β), eN(β)) ≤ 0.
The first inequality is shown in the following lemma. Lemma: G
(β)
f(β)
< G˜(β)
Proof of the Lemma.
G(β)
f(β)
− G˜(β) =
U k
pN−pN0
V (pN(β))g(k)dk −
U k
pN−pN0
V ((1 + α)β − eN(β))g(k)dk
U pN−pN0
k
V (pN0 (β) + k)g(k)dk −
U pN−pN0
k
V (αβ − eN(β) + k) < 0.
If G(β) ≥ 0 and G(β) < 0, in view of the continuity of G, there exists al least
a point β∗ where G(β∗) = 0, G(β∗) ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 12. (12.1) Let ξ > β, and let β∗ be any zero of G(β˜). The
lemma in the proof of the previous proposition implies G˜(β˜) > G
(β˜)
f(β˜)
= 0, and,
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since G˜(β) =
G(β)
f(β)
, the zero of G˜(β), call it β˜
∗
, satisfies β˜
∗
> β∗. Now con-
sider 0 = G˜(β˜
∗
) = R(β˜
∗
, eN(β˜
∗
), eE(β˜
∗
)) < R(β˜
∗
, eN(β˜
∗
), eN(β˜
∗
)). Again, this
follows from the fact that eE(β˜
∗
) minimizes R(β˜, eN(β˜
∗
), eE). Therefore the zero of
R(β˜
∗
, eN(β˜), eN(β˜
∗
)), ˜˜β, satisfies ˜˜β
∗
> β˜
∗
. Finally, R(˜˜β
∗
, eN(˜˜β
∗
), eN(˜˜β
∗
)) = 0 gives
U k
pN−pN0
V ((1 + α)
˜˜
β∗ − eN( ˜˜β∗))g(k)dk −
U k
pE−pE0
V (ξ + α
˜˜
β∗ − eN( ˜˜β∗))g(k)dk
+
U pN−pN0
k
V (α˜˜β
∗
− eN(˜˜β
∗
) + k)g(k)dk −
U pE−pE0
k
V (α˜˜β
∗
− eN(˜˜β
∗
) + k)g(k)dk
= (1− λ)F (
˜˜
β
∗
)
f(
˜˜
β
∗
)
( Q1
Q0+Q1
)ψ(eN(˜˜β
∗
)) > 0.
Notice that when ˜˜β∗ = ξ we have
−
U pN−pN0
pE−pE0
V ((1 + α)
˜˜
β∗ − eN( ˜˜β∗))g(k)dk −
U pN−pN0
pE−pE0
V (α
˜˜
β∗ − eN( ˜˜β∗) + k)g(k)dk < 0,
which contradicts the previous result. Therefore, it is necessary that ˜˜β∗ < ξ.
(12.2) Take the second derivative of G. Write G(β) = f(β)[G
(β)
f(β)
], and G(β) =
f (β)[G
(β)
f(β)
] + f(β)( d
dβ
)(G
(β)
f(β)
). The first term is zero at a stationary point. Now
consider
( d
dβ
)(G
(β)
f(β)
) = −(1− λ)( d
dβ
)(F (β)
f(β)
)[(α+ Q1
Q1+Q0
)ψ(eN(β))− αψ(eE(β))] < 0.
at every stationary point of G. As a consequence, there can be at most one
such point, establishing the continuity of β∗(ξ).
Proof of Proposition 13. From the proof of Proposition 10, if all mailers have the
type k, we have that pN0 (β) = αβ − eN(β). From Proposition 11 we have that,
G(β)
f(β)
= G˜(β). Finally, fromProposition 12 we have that forR(˜˜β
∗
, eN(˜˜β
∗
), eN(˜˜β
∗
)) =
0 to be satisfied it is necessary that ˜˜β
∗
= ξ. Moreover, it is satisfied that ˜˜β
∗
=
β˜
∗
= β∗ = ξ.
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